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Abstract I show how a formalization of Grice’s Brevity intuition, which I call
Efficiency (Meyer 2013, 2014), correctly distinguishes between acceptable and
unacceptable disjunctions that all seem to be redundant at first (e.g., Gajewski &
Sharvit 2012; Mayr & Romoli 2013). The upshot is that the presence of embedded
implicatures is one way of making a structure efficient in the formal sense developed
here. I show that a particular prediction of Efficiency—the existence of embedded
implicatures resulting in overall weakening of meaning—is not incorrect, and sheds
new light on the role of rise-fall-rise intonation in these cases (Fox & Spector 2013;
Büring 1997).
Keywords: Implicatures, Disjunction, Economy, Redundancy, Exhaustification, Embedded
implicatures, Contrastive-Topic Intonation, Meta-linguistic negation
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The nature of scalar implicatures remains a debated topic. Some theories view
the step from some to not all as an instance of rational inferences not specific to
language. Others propose that the inference arises instead through a language-
specific mechanism (e.g., Sauerland 2011 and references therein). Specifically,
proponents of the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures assume a covert operator
that strengthens the semantic denotation of its (propositional) argument by adding
the negation of certain scalar alternatives. For example:
(1) Jexh [A or B]K= (A∨B)∧¬(A∧B)
If we accept that exh is available in the functional lexicon, the question arises as to
what principles guide its syntactic distribution. In this paper I suggest that this is
partly predicted by a constraint against redundancy, which may itself be a language-
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independent, rational principle as envisaged by Grice. The main ideas to be defended
are thus the following:
• The distribution of exh is restricted by a pragmatic principle of Efficiency
• Efficiency rules out redundant structures if there is a simpler competitor
• Insertion of exh can sometimes rescue an otherwise redundant structure
1.2 Data
Consider the following two formulae:
(2) a. A∨B
b. A∨(¬A∧B)
The two are equivalent.1 But (2b) is a redundant formula given the availability of
the shorter (2a). This might lead to expectations about the corresponding natural
language structures, especially if we follow Grice in assuming that language use
is guided by a principle constraining prolixity: We might expect a contrast in
acceptability:
(3) a. Mary studied math or she studied physics.
b. Mary studied math or she didn’t and she studied physics.
Contrary to our expectations, both the prolix and the briefer, more efficient version
are licensed. In view of this, consider now a second minimal pair:
(4) a. Mary studied math or physics or both.
b. # Mary didn’t study math or physics or both.
Both sentences seem to be redundant in the same way that (3b) is; compare the
corresponding logical formulae:
(5) a. (A∨B)∨(A∧B) ≡ (A∨B)
b. ¬[(A∨B)∨(A∧B)] ≡ ¬(A∨B)
1 The proof is trivial:
(i) A∨(¬A∧B)≡ (A∨¬A)∧(A∨B)≡ ⊺∧(A∨B)≡ (A∨B)
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But whereas (4a) is felicitous, the equally redundant (4b) sounds odd. The questions
raised by the two pairs in (3) and (4) are thus:
Q: What distinguishes felicitous from infelicitous redundancy?
Q-1: Why is a seemingly redundant sentence of the form A or not A and B
licensed?
Q-2: Why is a seemingly redundant sentence of the form A or B or both
licensed, when its equally redundant negation not [A or B or both] is
not?
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a general theory of redundancy;
my goal here is to contribute to this broader agenda by addressing the two specific
sub-questions stated above, thus extending some previous work in this area (Meyer
2013, 2014). To anticipate, I will argue that felicitous cases of (seeming) redundancy
involve LFs that are made non-redundant by insertion of exh. The infelicitous cases
are such that no adjunction site of exh would yield a non-redundant LF. This answer
entails that the simple logical formulae above do not in fact capture the semantics of
the corresponding sentences—it’s more complicated.
2 Core proposal
Above I alluded to the Gricean intuition that language use obeys a principle of brevity.
In previous work I have proposed the following formalization of this intuition:
(6) Efficiency
An LF φ is ruled out if there is a distinct competitor ψ such that (i) ψ < φ
and (ii) JψK≡ JφK
The idea is to use Katzir (2007)’s notion of structural complexity to define a set
of competitors against which redundancy of a given LF is evaluated. Structural
complexity is defined in terms of the ‘at-most-as-complex’ relation ≲. ψ ≲ φ iff
ψ can be derived from φ by substituting terminal nodes in φ with items from the
lexicon (e.g., replace or with and), and/or substituting φ with a subconstituent (e.g.,
substitute A for A or B; see Katzir (2007); Fox & Katzir (2011); Trinh & Haida
(2015) for details). ψ is strictly simpler than φ , ψ < φ , iff ψ ≲ φ ∧ ¬(φ ≲ψ).
Going back to the pair in (3), we can thus ask why A or not A and B is acceptable,
even though there seems to be a strictly simpler, equivalent competitor A or B. This
is the first sub-question from above (Q-1), and we will address it in what follows.
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Addressing Q-1 First consider the simplest LF for the complex disjunction:
(7) LF1
Mary studied math or [she didn’t study math and she studied physics]
The competitors for such an LF include the simple disjunction:2
(8) COMP(LF1) = {Mary studied math or she studied physics, . . . }
It is easy to see that this competitor is semantically equivalent, and strictly simpler
than LF1. LF1 is thus ruled out by Efficiency.
I assume a covert exhaustivity operator exh with the following semantics –
roughly, it adds to its argument φ the negation of φ ’s alternatives in keeping with
consistency (I use sloppy notation in not distinguishing between object- and meta-
language):
(9) Jexh φK= φ ∧ ∀ψ ∈ IE(φ): ¬ψ
(10) ψ ∈ IE(φ) iff ψ ∈ALT(φ) and ¬(φ →ψ) and there is no χ s.t. χ ∈ALT(φ)
and φ ∧¬ψ → χ 3
Consider the definition of the set IE of innocently excludable alternatives: even
though A ∈ALT(A or B), A is not in the set IE(A or B) because ¬A∧(A∨B) → B,
and B is itself in ALT(φ ), since B ≲ [A or B]. Together, then, the standard scalar
implicature of disjunction will be derived with the following LF (using transparent
abbreviations):
(11) LF2
exh [Mary studied math or [she didn’t study math and she studied physics]]
IE = {⊥, [math and physics]}4
= Mary studied math or physics & ¬(Mary studied math and physics)
2 Recall that competitors are those structures that are strictly simpler than LF1, in the technical sense
defined below (6). Roughly, competing structures are those that can be derived by substitution of
terminal nodes and substitution with subconstituents in LF1. The particular competitor given below
can be derived in two ways. Following Katzir 2007, we may allow for a deletion operation: [Mary
studied math or she didn’t study math and she studied physics]. Here I followed Fox & Katzir (2011);
Trinh & Haida (2015) in only allowing for substitution with sub-constituents. To derive the above
competitor by substitution, the sub-constituent [she didn’t study math and she studied physics] can
be substituted by its underlined subconstituent within the full structure.
3 This is a simplified semantics which, for the examples discussed in this paper, is fully sufficient. For
a more fine-grained semantics see Fox (2007).
4 Using Katzir’s algorithm, the set of structures ψ s.t. ψ ≲ LF2 is the following: ALT (math or [¬math
and physics]) = {math, [¬math and physics], math and [¬math and physics] (=⊥), .....}. Since the
argument of exh, [math or [¬math and physics]] is equivalent to a simple disjunction math or physics,
the only alternatives that exh can negate is the one given above.
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Given the principle of Efficiency, this LF will only be licensed if there is no simpler
competitor that expresses the same exclusive disjunctive meaning. Such a competitor
does exist, however, ruling out LF2 as well:
(12) COMP(LF2) = {exh [Mary studied math or she studied physics],. . . }
= Mary studied math or physics & ¬(Mary studied math and physics)
Consider now the effect of embedded exhaustification as in LF3:
(13) LF3
[exh Mary studied math] or [she didn’t study math and she studied physics]
I assume that the only relevant alternative for the first disjunct is given by she studied
physics.5
(14) JLF3K= (Mary studied math and not physics) or she studied physics and not
math
This is an exclusive disjunctive meaning. Schematically:
(15) LF3
[[exh A] or [not A and B]]
= A▽B
Is LF3 efficient? An exclusive disjunction is standardly expressed by a structure
of the form exh [A or B], which seems to be structurally simpler than LF3. Recall
that LF2 was also blocked by such a simple LF. Crucially, however, LF3 is not in
competition with such a structure. This is because Efficiency is defined in terms
of the structure-sensitive relation ≲: An LF φ will only be blocked by competitors
derivable from φ via a restricted set of syntactic operations—intuitively, those
operations which do not increase complexity. As it turns out, there is no way of
generating a simpler, equivalent competitor for LF3 which satisfies these conditions.
In particular, the standard LF for exclusive disjunctions is not in fact in structural
competition with LF3:
5 There can be many other structural alternatives, e.g., Mary got drunk. These will not have any effect
on the result. Assume that the embedded exh in LF3 negates further alternatives. I assume that
alternatives have to stay constant across competitors when checking Efficiency. The fact remains
that there will be no simpler competitor to express this meaning and that in particular, LF* is not a
structural competitor. In view of additional alternatives, if it were a competitor, it would no longer be
equivalent.
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(16) LF3
exh A
or
not A and B
(17) LF *
exh
A or B
It is not the case that LF* < LF3. According to the definition of < given below (6)
above, LF* would have to be derived from LF3 by substitution with sub-constituents
and/or lexical items. Suppose we start with the following substitution, then:
(18) [[exh A] or [not A and B]] Ð→ [[exh A] or B]
To get to LF* from the right-hand structure would require an additional, illicit
operation, namely, the movement of the locally adjoined exh to the matrix position:
(19) [[exh A] or B] 8
But according to the definition of ≲ (see (6) above), the movement operation does
not preserve complexity and LF* ≮ LF3. It should be noted that the derivation in
(18) does yield a structure that is strictly simpler than, LF3. But this structure is not
semantically equivalent to LF3 and therefore not a competitor w.r.t. Efficiency.6
Efficiency thus correctly predicts that complex disjunctions like (3b) can be
licensed. Crucially, though, this can only be achieved by (non-vacuous) embedded
exhaustification. LF3 is thus the only licensed structure for (3b).7 The predicted
interpretation is that of an an exclusive disjunction. This prediction is empirically
6 Suppose, as we have done for LF3, that the set IE in the right-hand LF in (18) consists of just B.
Then J[[exh A] or B]K= (A∧¬B)∨B = (A∨B). LF3, however, expresses an exclusive disjunction.
The same result (modulo additional implicatures for LF3) will be obtained when more alternatives
C,D, . . . are in IE.
7 There is a fourth LF, which we haven’t considered yet:
(i) LF4
[A or [not A and [exh B]]]
= A∨B
By parity of reasoning let the alternative for exh be simply A, so that IE = {A}. This will result in
the inclusive disjunctive meaning shown above. LF4 is blocked because there is (at least) one simpler
competitor that expresses this meaning:
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correct, as the following data show (contra Mayr & Romoli 2013):
(20) I’m not sure if Mary has two degrees, but. . .
a. # She either studied math or she didn’t and she studied physics
b. She either studied math or physics8
The contrast below makes the same point:
(21) a. (Either) Mary studied math or she studied physics. . .
perhaps even both.
b. (Either) Mary studied math or she didn’t and she studied physics. . .
# perhaps even both.
One might argue that (21b) is ruled out by an independent constraint on anaphoric
both. According to this argument, the antecedent of both needs to be a constituent of
the form [A or B] which it then turns into the corresponding conjunctive meaning.
As the only available antecedent of that form yields a contradiction when conjoined
(i.e, she both studied math and didn’t and studied physics), the continuation is ruled
out by this independent factor.9
However, if this alternative explanation were on the right track, the following
minimal variation should be just as degraded as (21b), which it isn’t:
(22) (Either) Mary studied math or she didn’t and she studied physics. . .
definitely not both.
Even though the possible antecedents for both are given in exactly the same con-
figuration as in (21b), the continuation is felicitous. The only difference between
(21b) and (22) is that the continuation in (21b) contradicts an exclusive disjunction
meaning, while reinforcing it in (22). In sum, the contrast in (21), in conjunction
with the observation in (22), is evidence in favor of the current proposal, specifically,
the prediction that the only efficient LF for sentences like A or not A and B yield an
(ii) COMP([A or [not A and [exh B]]]) = {[A or B], . . . }
LF3 remains the only efficient structure for the complex disjunction.
8 One might object that (21) involves a confound: The first sentence signals that the speaker is not
informed about the alternative [math and physics]. This might be said to interfere with the availability
of this alternative. If this were the case, (20b) would be expected to be acceptable a fortiori. The
infelicity of (20a) would still follow from the proposed account: With the predicted LF3, embedded
exh only needs physics as an alternative to make the whole structure express an exclusive meaning,
inconsistent with the first sentence in (21).
9 Thanks to Irene Heim for pointing out this potential objection.
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exclusive disjunction meaning.10
SUMMARY Q-1 The goal of this paragraph was to find out why (3b) is licensed
despite its seeming redundancy in view of the simple disjunction (3a). The principle
of Efficiency was proposed as a formalization of the intuitive notion of redundancy.
Applying it to the seemingly redundant structure A or not A and B revealed that
local exhaustification is at the heart of the felicity of this structure: Parsing it as LF3
yields an exclusive disjunctive meaning. Crucially, this LF, and this LF alone, is
not blocked by another way of expressing (exclusive) disjunction, specifically, it is
not blocked by exh [A or B]. This is an important finding, insofar as it points to the
limits of structural competition with respect to Efficiency: A given LF competes
only with a restricted set of structures—roughly, those which can be derived by
substitution with subconstituents (and lexical items), but not those which involve
syntactic movement in addition.
Addressing Q-2 We will now consider the contrast from (4) above, which was
noted by Gajewski & Sharvit (2012):
(23) a. Mary studied math or physics or both.
b. # Mary didn’t study math or physics or both.
I have proposed an account of the Hurford disjunction in (23a) elsewhere, to which
we will return briefly at the end of the paper. Here I want to concentrate on the
infelicity of (23b). As we will see, Efficiency correctly predicts that there cannot
be a non-redundant LF for this sentence. Following are the candidates and the
competitors that block them:
(24) LF1
not [[math or physics] or [math and physics]]
= ¬ (Mary studied math or physics)
(25) COMP(LF1) = {not [math or physics], . . . }
= ¬ (Mary studied math or physics)
This competitor is derived via substitution with sub-constituents and is therefore
simpler than LF1. As it is also semantically equivalent to LF1, LF1 is ruled out by
Efficiency. As expected, vacuous exhaustification above the negation is likewise
ruled out:
10 See Meyer (2015: 16) for a proposal on propositional anaphora under which both (21b) and (22) are
predicted to have an available anaphor, derived from taking the constituent [Mary studied math or she
didn’t and she studied physics] and substituting the second disjunct by its subconstituent, to obtain
[Mary studied math or she studied physics]. The fact remains that the observed contrast between
(21b) and (22) could not be due to the anaphor both.
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(26) LF2
exh not [[math or physics] or [math and physics]]
= ¬ (Mary studied math or physics)
The clause below exh denotes the negated disjunction, as seen in LF1. All alternatives
for the exh-operator are therefore entailed by its argument: Mary didn’t study math,
Mary didn’t study physics, Mary didn’t study math and physics. Therefore, no
alternative can be negated without contradiction, i.e., the set IE is empty. The
resulting meaning is thus the same as before, and so is the simpler competitor
expressing this meaning:
(27) COMP(LF2) = {not [math or physics], . . . }
= ¬ (Mary studied math or physics)
Exhaustification below negation, on the other hand, does have a semantic effect. An
LF involving such embedded exhaustification might thus stand a chance of satisfying
Efficiency:
(28) LF3
not exh [[math or physics] or [math and physics]]ALT ([[math or physics] or [math and physics]]) =
{[math or physics], [math and physics], math, physics}
IE = {[math and physics]}
= ¬ [(Mary studied math or physics) & ¬ (Mary studied math and physics)]
The meaning expressed by this LF is more complex: Mary studied either both or
none of the two. But is this LF efficient, i.e., is there a simpler equivalent competitor?
It turns out that there is:
(29) COMP(LF3) = {not exh [math or physics], . . . }
= ¬ [(Mary studied math or physics) & ¬ (Mary studied math and physics)
We will discuss structures like this competitor LF, which involve weakening effects
of exhaustification, in the next section. For now, it suffices to note that the structure
is predicted to block LF3. Let us lastly turn to the following possible LF:
(30) LF4
not [exh[math or physics] or [math and physics]]
IE = {[math and physics]}11¬ [[(math or physics) & ¬ (math and physics)] or (math and physics)]
11 This will be the set of excludable alternatives regardless of whether or not we include only [math and
physics], i.e., the other disjunct, or the full Sauerland-set {math, physics, math and physics}.
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= ¬ (Mary studied math or physics)
Though exhaustification is not vacuous locally, the meaning of the LF as a whole
is simply that of a negated disjunction. Again, there is a competitor with the same
semantics:
(31) COMP(LF4) = {not [math or physics], . . . }
= ¬ (Mary studied math or physics)
As a consequence, LF4 will be ruled out as well.
SUMMARY Q-2 In sum, the principle of Efficiency straightforwardly derives the
infelicity of negated Hurford disjunctions like (23b). As we saw, all possible parses
conflict with Efficiency—there is always a simpler structural competitor. Under the
current proposal, this is the source of their infelicity.
3 Extension: weakening implicatures
Efficiency does not rule out cases where structural complexity incurs semantic
weakening. In particular, the principle licenses exhaustification in the scope of
downward-entailing operators like negation:
(32) LF1
not exh [A or B]
IE = {[A and B]}12
= ¬[(A∨B)∧¬(A∧B)]
= ¬(A∨B) ∨(A∧B)
My claim here is that LFs like (32) are indeed attested, as Efficiency predicts.
Specifically, I suggest that some cases of ‘meta-linguistic negation’ (Horn 1989) are
an instance of these weakening embedded implicatures.13 Consider (33):
12 The specific make-up of IE is based on the assumption that ALT is the Sauerland-set. If there is
another alternative for the whole disjunction, e.g., C, the meaning will be different. Most likely,
this meaning can only be expressed with only, cf. John didn’t #{only} ask Mary or Sue. . . He asked
Bill as well, and not with the LF above. As we will see below, these assumptions about (32) are
consistent with facts about focus-marking: For the weakening implicature to arise, the disjunction
needs to receive pitch accent, which I will argue is part of a complex topic marking. I assume this
indicates F-marking on or. Following Fox & Katzir (2011); Fox & Spector (2013), only the F-marked
constituents (here: the terminal node or) is targeted by substitution (here: with and), yielding the
assumed alternative set and IE {[A and B]}.
13 Horn himself pointed out that standard negation could cover his ‘meta-liguistic’ uses under the —at
the time unthinkable—assumption that scalar implicatures arise during semantic computation:‘Such
examples cannot be collapsed under Karttunen & Peter’s [contradiction negation] approach with-
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(33) Mary didn’t study math OR physics. . . she studied both!
In what follows I will sketch an account of (33) in terms of embedded exhaustifica-
tion, i.e., an LF like (32). I propose a compositional account of how the characteristic
intonational pattern associated with (33) disambiguates in favor of the LF in (32)
(this is question Q-1). I will then discuss open issues pertaining to the the role of the
continuation . . . both! (question Q-2).
Addressing Q-1 It is well-known that there is a characteristic intonational contour
associated with (33). A closer look reveals that phonological focus, i.e., pitch accent
on or, is insufficient to disambiguate in favor of the weakening implicature (contra
Fox & Spector 2013):
(34) A: Mary DIDN’TH∗ buy the Porsche ORH∗ the MercedesLL%.
B: So she didn’t buy any car?
C: # So she bought two cars?
The final fall in (34) seems to re-enforce the strong reading brought about by LFs
like not [A or B]. The weakening implicature, by contrast, requires a final rise in
addition to the pitch accent. Interestingly, it seems to be the pattern associated with
contrastive topics (s. Jackendoff 1972; Büring 2003):14
(35) A: Mary DIDN’TH∗ buy the Porsche ORL+H∗ the MercedesLH%.
B: ✓ So she bought two cars?
C: # So she didn’t buy any car?15
But just what is the role of the CT-contour L+H∗LH% in cases like (33)? As stated
earlier, my suggestion is that the CT-contour disambiguates in favor of an LF as in
(32). To derive this formally, I follow Büring (2003) in assuming that the contour
comes with the following inference:
(36) At least one question in JφKCT is left open after asserting φ
out incorporating conversational implicata (. . . ) into the logical form of these sentences [emphasis
mine]. But conversational implicata by definition are not part of logical form.’ (Horn 1989:370)
14 It is often assumed that the pitch accent on contrastive phrases involves a steeper rise, i.e., L+H∗,
which is why I marked it as such here. See e.g., Hirschberg & Pierrehumbert (1986); Watson,
Tanenhaus & Gunlogson (2008). Though Horn discussed the similarity to Jackendoff’s ‘B-accent’
he did not put forward a formal proposal about the exact semantic contribution of this contour in
utterances like (33).
15 The infelicity of this follow-up question is an instance of the observation discussed below, namely,
that . . . neither continuations are impossible under CT-intonation. Given this fact, the oddness of
C’s reaction indicates that under the given intonation, only the weakening not exh [A or B] parse is
available, but not the strong parse not [A or B].
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JφKCT is the contrastive topic semantic value of φ and can be thought of as a set of
question meanings. Looking at the LF in (32) involving the weakening exh-operator,
we can now ask what CT-inference this LF would give rise to. As can be seen from
(36), this will depend on its CT-value, which is given below (see Büring 2003 for
details):16
(37) JnotF exh [A orCT B]KCT =
{A or B but not both?, A and B?}
According to (36), the CT-inference associated with this LF is that either the question
whether A or B but not both, or the question whether A and B are left open after the
assertion, i.e., by the standard semantic value of this LF, which is given below:
(38) JnotF exh [A orCT B]K
= ¬[(A∨B)∧¬(A∧B)]
= ¬(A∨B) ∨ (A∧B)
(38) leaves open the last question in the CT-value above, namely, whether A and B.
This is exactly the open issue that the continuation subsequently resolves.
What happens if a sentence involving the same focus- and CT-marking is parsed
without embedded exh? The CT-inference is predicted to be different, as is the
standard semantic value:
(39) LF2
notF [A orCT B]JLF2K= ¬(A∨B)JLF2KCT = {A or B?, A and B?}
Importantly, the CT inference brought about by the intonational contour is false
under LF2. This is because the basic semantic meaning is very strong: ¬(A∨B).
As such, it answers both questions in the CT-value, i.e., whether A or B (no!) and
whether A and B (again no!).
The foregoing discussion is summarized in the diagram below:
16 I assume that the negation is focused, as indicated by its pitch accent. Again I use sloppy notation in
that the italicized questions are short for their semantic denotations.
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Assert:!
“not [A or B]”
¬A B ¬B A
¬B ¬A                      A B
Assert: !
“not exh [A or B]”
answers
leaves open
¬B A¬A B
¬B ¬A A B
exh [A or B]?![A and B]?
Figure 1 Does the assertion leave open a question in the CT-value? Difference between
LF with embedded exh and simple LF.
Independent evidence that the intonational pattern comes with an inference
along these lines comes from the following contrast (see Büring 2003 for detailed
discussion):
(40) Mary solved SOMEL+H∗ of the p-setsLH%.JKCT = {did Mary solve some of the p-sets?, did Mary solve all of the p-sets?}
(41) # Mary solved ALLL+H∗ of the p-setsLH%.JKCT = {did Mary solve some of the p-sets?, did Mary solve all of the
p-sets?}
In (40), the underlined question in the CT-value is still left open by the assertion,
and the sentence is felicitous. But in (41), no question is left open, and the sentence
sounds odd under the given contour.17
We are now in a position to formulate a hypothesis about Q-1: what is the role of
the intonational pattern? As suggested by Büring (1997), CT-inferences may act as
‘a filter on LFs’ in that those structures which falsify the corresponding inference are
blocked. As seen by the oddness of (41), if no other parse is available to circumvent
a conflict with the CT-inference, a sentence may become infelicitous. In the case of
our initial sentence notF A orCT B, only the LF containing embedded exhaustification
satisfies the relevant CT-inference, whereas the LF without the embedded implicature
does not. Thus, assuming a syntactic operator exh, the role of intonation in ‘meta-
linguistic’ negation like (33) can be unified with the scope-reversal cases discussed
by Jackendoff and Büring: via its semantic contribution, the intonational contour
disambiguates between different LFs.
17 As can be seen from the CT-values, I assume that these sentences include verum focus which is not
realized phonetically. Note also that the LF exh [Mary solved SOME of the p-sets] would conflict
with the CT-inference as well, though re-interpretation as in (40) prevents the sentence from sounding
odd. Lastly, a different intonational contour, with the pitch accent realized on p-sets, can make (41)
acceptable. This is predicted given principles of focus projection (e.g., Selkirk 1995).
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So far, we predict that when the contour is used, the only available LF will
contain an embedded, weakening implicature. But the implication seems to hold
in the other direction as well: Under the ‘meta-linguistic’ use, the only available
intonation is the CT-contour, at least for the speakers I have consulted so far (s. (34)).
Assume that these intuitions can be substantiated by more systematic empirical
investigation. Following Roberts (1996), the CT-inference in (36) could be modeled
as a presupposition, making its use subject to Heim’s Maximize Presupposition
(Heim 1991).18
Summarizing thus far, (42) has to be parsed as LF1 given its intonation:
(42) Mary didn’t study math OR physicsLH%. . .
LF1: not exh [A or B]
= ¬(A∨B) ∨ (A∧B)
Addressing Q-2 Semantically, LF1 is consistent with Mary having studied both
subjects, and none of the two.19 The role of the continuation seems to be to fully
resolve this issue. But, as illustrated below, whereas the . . . both continuation is
possible, perhaps even obligatory for (42), the equally consistent continuation in
(43b) is highly marked:
(43) Mary DIDN’T study math OR physicsLH%. . .
a. she studied both.
b. ?? she didn’t study anything/she studied neither.
At first it seems that this asymmetry follows from independent constraints on focus
placement in contrastive negation. Specifically, if a statement ν is negated and con-
trasted with an alternative statement α , focus-placement in ν is subject to constraints
that are partly determined by α (and vice versa). This is illustrated below (e.g.,
Rooth 1992):
18 Note incidentally that this offers the perspective of a competition between the falling contour H*LL%
as in (34) and the rising L+H*LH% contour: The former would give rise to the anti-presupposition
that the presupposition of the CT-inference is not met (Percus 2006; Sauerland 2008), i.e., that there
are no open questions in the CT-value. For a sentence like John ate SOME of the cookies (with verum
focus), the falling contour would then anti-presuppose that one question in {did John eat some of the
cookies?, did John eat all of the cookies?} is left open. This, in turn, can only be satisfied if exh is
adjoined. Reversely, with raising intonation a question in this value would have to be left open, which
is only possible without exh. Further research is needed to establish whether the predicted correlation
between falling vs. raising intonation and presence vs. absence of implicatures can be substantiated.
19 In an unpublished manuscript, Fox & Spector (2013) argue for an LF of (33) under which the sentence
would have a conjunctive meaning: Mary studied math and physics. Under this proposal, it is unclear
why the continuation . . . she studied both! is even allowed, and even more mysterious why it would
be needed.
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(44) Mary didn’t INVITEF Bill. . .
a. # she invited FREDF.
b. ✓ she SUMMONEDF him.
Uncontroversially, I assume that the pitch accent on OR reflects abstract F-marking
on the connective,20 which in turn means that the alternatives which (43) can be
contrasted with are just the singleton set in (45a):
(45) a. ALT (A orF B) = {A and B}
b. ALT ([A or B]F) = {C, D, . . . }
The prediction is that not only . . . neither, but also other continuations that do not
obey the relevant parallelism constraint should be ruled out. This prediction is borne
out:
(46) a. Mary DIDN’T study math OR physics LH% . . . # she studied CHEM-
ISTRY
b. Mary DIDN’T study [math or PHYSICS]LH% . . .✓ she studied CHEM-
ISTRY
Though this might be an independent explanation as to why the neither continuation
in (43b) is ruled out, it doesn’t carry over to the following case, where it predicts
(47b) to be acceptable:
(47) Mary DIDN’T read SOME of the booksLH%. . .
a. she read all of them.
b. ?? she read none of them.
As far as I have been able to check, (47b) is still marked when compared to (47a).
I cannot provide an answer to this puzzle here, except to note that in addition to
the above constraint on focus placement, another factor in the asymmetry between
the two semantically possible resolutions might be the overall QUD that’s being
addressed, for instance, What did Mary study? or How many of the books did Mary
read?. It has been argued that wh-questions carry an existential presupposition
(Karttunen & Peters 1979; Comorovski 1996). An analogous requirement on the
common ground might hold for QUDs, i.e., the current topic of conversation. In a
context where what Mary studied is being discussed, resolving a sentence that is
semantically consistent with Mary having studied neither or both of the two relevant
subjects in favor of the former possibility would negate the appropriateness of the
current conversational topic. Only the . . . both resolution is in line with the relevant
20 See Krifka (2007) for the relation between CTs and F-marking.
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requirement on the common ground that there is something that Mary studied.21
In closing this section I would like to briefly illustrate the suggestion with another
DE-operator, exploring its potential to extend to weakening implicatures beyond the
case of negation.
(48) EVERYbodyF who failed the oral ORCT the written exam passed. . .
but nobody who failed both did.
Consider the LF with exh embedded in the restrictor of the universal quantifier:
(49) LF1
everybody who exh [failed the oral or the written exam] passedJLF1K= ∀x ∶ [O(x)∨W(x)∧¬(O(x)∧W(x))] → P(x)JLF1KCT = {how many who did O or W but not both passed?, how many
who did O and W passed?}
The ordinary semantic value of LF1 leaves open the last question, i.e., how many of
those who failed both the oral and the written exam passed.22 By contrast, if there is
no embedded exh the CT-inference will be false:
(50) LF2
everybody who [failed the oral or the written exam] passedJLF2K= ∀x ∶ O(x)∨W(x) → P(x)JLF2KCT = {how many who did O or W passed?, how many who did O and
W passed?}
The meaning of LF2 answers both questions. Therefore, LF1 containing weakening
embedded exh satisfies the CT-inference, but LF2 does not. The case is thus parallel
to the previously discussed example involving negation.
SUMMARY: WEAKENING IMPLICATURES In sum, the LFs involving embedded
exh below negation or in the restrictor of a universal quantifier satisfy the inference
associated with the CT-contour, but those LFs without embedded exhaustification do
21 It should be kept in mind that this line of explanation may lead to the same issues raised in the previous
footnote with respect to Fox & Spector’s proposal: Together with this requirement (‘presupposition’)
of the QUD, the sentence would come to mean that Mary studied math and physics. The redundancy
(!) of the . . . both continuation would again be puzzling. Differences in the level of meaning might
play a role here, namely, whether the conjunctive meaning corresponds to the semantic denotation (as
in Fox & Spector’s proposal) or whether it is derived from context in conjunction with the semantics.
22 The additional scalar implicature that ¬(everybody who failed the oral and the written exam passed the
class) would not answer the question either (it could be no students or some). Under the grammatical
view taken here, this implicature would be derived by an additional exh in matrix position. As
a consequence, the intonational contour does not rule out such an LF, as long as there is also an
embedded exh.
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not. Why is the CT-contour required for weakening implicatures as in LF2? This
concerns the status of the CT-inference: It might be a presupposition, positioning
the obligatory intonational marking of weakening implicatures within the scope of
Heim’s Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim 1991). This, however, conflicts
with evidence suggesting that CT-intonation is not obligatory when it is used to
signal discourse structure (s. Meyer, Fedorenko & Gibson 2012). Further research is
needed to establish (i) whether intonational marking of weakening implicatures is in
fact obligatory and (ii) at what level of meaning the CT-inference is located.
4 Outlook: back to Hurford
In section 2 we saw how the infelicity of (51b) follows from Efficiency: For all
possible LFs, there exists a simpler equivalent competitor which blocks it. By the
same logic, we expect to find at least one LF which satisfies Efficiency for (51a), as
the sentence is felicitous:
(51) a. Mary studied math or physics or both.
b. # Mary didn’t study math or physics or both.
However, it turns out that all possible LFs for (51a) are blocked by a simpler
competitor. To briefly illustrate this, consider two possible LFs for (51a):23
(52) a. LF1 [[A or B] or [A and B]]
b. LF2 [exh[A or B] or [A and B]]
The meaning of these two LFs is A∨B. Both are blocked by the same competitor:
(53) COMP(LF1,LF2) = {[A or B], . . . }
Likewise, LF3 = exh[[A or B] or [A and B]] will have the meaning of an exclusive
disjunction, but will be blocked by the competitor exh[A or B].
Therefore, whatever the correct LF will turn out to be (and its felicity tells us that
there must be one), the prediction is that (51a) will not have a standard inclusive or
exclusive disjunction meaning. In previous work I argued that this is in fact a correct
prediction, because the meaning of (51a) (semantically) conveys true ignorance24
with respect to the corresponding conjunction and thereby differs from simpler
23 As stated earlier, I do not want to commit to the claim that both is represented as a full conjunctive
phrase at LF; for present purposes it suffices to make the innocuous assumption that its meaning is
equivalent to [A and B].
24 By true ignorance I mean uncertainty that is inconsistent with certainty about the corresponding
negation. Simply put: ¬K(φ) ∧ ¬K(¬φ), as opposed to ¬K(φ), i.e., uncertainty about φ , which is
consistent with K(¬φ).
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disjunctions (see Meyer 2013: ch. 2.3 for details).
We now have two observations: First, (51a) is felicitous despite blocking com-
petitors for both the inclusive and the exclusive disjunction meaning. Secondly,
(51a) has a meaning component which distinguishes it from standard (inclusive or
exclusive) disjunction: true ignorance about the conjunction. Here I would like to
offer the following perspective on these observations. I suggest that the ignorance
inference about the conjunction arises as a rescue strategy to make (51a) efficient
after all. In other words, the only way (51a) can avoid blocking by a simpler com-
petitor is to somehow acquire the observed true ignorance meaning. My claim as to
how this comes about is this:
(54) Rescuing by K
An operator K expressing doxastic necessity relative to the speaker can be
inserted at matrix position25
Simply adjoining a matrix K won’t result in an efficient LF for (51a).26 Rather, Effi-
ciency predicts exactly one possible LF for the sentence, which involves embedded
exhaustification:
(55) Efficient LF for (51a)
exh K [exh [A or B] or [A and B]]
= K(A∨B)∧¬K(A∧B)∧¬K¬(A∧B)
As shown, the meaning of this LF indeed entails true ignorance with respect to A and
B. But if K can be parsed at matrix position to rescue otherwise inefficient structures,
can we still derive the infelicity of the structure we started out with, i.e., # not [A or
B or both]? It turns out that K will not be able to rescue this sentence: All possible
configurations of K and exh have a simpler equivalent competitor.27
Here I cannot develop the envisaged rescuing account for (51a) in more detail.
A crucial ingredient will be independent arguments for the existence of the proposed
K-rescue strategy. Indeed, a doxastic universal operator has been assumed precisely
25 I assume that exh may outscope K.
26 For instance, just adjoining it without exhaustifying will yield LF4 = K[[A or B] or [A and B]]. As is
obvious, this LF will be blocked by the simpler K[A or B].
27 This is illustrated for the least obvious candidate LF below:
(i) LF1 exh K not exh [[A or B] or [A and B]]
= K[¬(A∨B)∨(A∧B)] ∧ ¬K(¬(A∨B)) ∧ ¬K(A∧B) ∧ ¬K(A∨B)
(ii) COMP(LF1) = {exh K not exh [A or B]}
= K[¬(A∨B)∨(A∧B)] ∧ ¬K(¬(A∨B)) ∧ ¬K(A∧B) ∧ ¬K(A∨B)
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in this role in accounts of such diverse phenomena as Free Choice disjunction, modal
indefinites and modal auxiliaries, among others (e.g., Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002;
Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Hacquard 2010).
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